

Appendix 2E

Appropriate Scales for Australian Sub-National Governments

Scales of human activity and organisation have been a significant focus of human geographers and other researchers in recent decades (see, for example, Harvey 2000; Howitt 2003; and other literature compiled in Table 2E-3 below), and are considered here to generally guide assessments of Australia's government structure, especially at sub-national levels, and to address specific questions of relevance to this study, and which further motivate this work, such as:

- Which scales of human settlement and human organisation generally, and in Australia in particular, are suitable for sub-national governments in terms of populations and land areas or otherwise?
- Do Australia's current State, Territory and local governments serve populations and land areas which are of a suitable scale for their respective forms of government? Are better scales possible? What are the most apt scales?

With its vast land area and extremely low population density, Australia clearly has an especially acute need for highly efficient and effective sub-national governments, but it is less clear that STUs as large as NSW and VIC in population, and WA and QLD in land area, can provide democratic governments which are close enough to the people and different enough from the Australia-wide scale to serve any useful purpose. It can be argued that all five mainland States, at least, are too large in population and land area to serve a useful purpose, and that they clash with and take attention away from other scales within the bounds of the Australian continent which are far more significant socially, economically, environmentally and generally, and which have more substantive claims to be represented in Australia's government structure, such as the following scales (Alexander et al. 1977: 4; McMaster and Sheppard 2004: 4-5):

- Individual people;
- households and families;
- neighbourhoods, tribes and localities;
- regions (as generally understood); and
- Australia as a whole.

Gough Whitlam (1957: 33) claimed the States are too large in some senses and too small in others:

There are few functions which the State Parliaments now perform which would not be better performed by the Australian Parliament or by regional councils. The States are too large to deal with local matters and too small and weak to deal with national ones. Three-quarters of the acts

which each State Parliament passes are repetitions of the acts which each State Parliament passes. The same applies to regulations gazetted by each State government. Most of this legislation does not refer to local matters but to matter which are the same from one end of Australia to the other. ... The present State boundaries were imposed on Australians a century ago from Westminster. There is no economic reason for preserving them. They merely serve to maintain the domination of the commercial and political interests which are centred in the State capitals.

Keniry et al. (2003: 18; see also 2, 5, 28), in the publication *Regional Business: A Plan for Action*, similarly argue that "Australia's federated system of government, developed in the late 19th century for the challenges of the 20th century, does not cope well with 21st century reality", because "local governments are generally too small and state governments are too large to provide the systems of governance and certainty required by regional business", whereas "regional structures based on the right-sized regional footprint are required". The Commonwealth, according to Keniry et al. (2003: 28), is also "often too remote from the needs of individual regions".

Appendix 2E has four sections which provide insights into the sub-national scales which could feature in an improved Australian government structure. The first assesses significant scales of organisation for Australians and Australian governments. The second highlights the gigantic land areas of Australia's STU and local government units. The third compares Australia with California, Texas and New York, the three most populous American States, in terms of population, land area and local government numbers, to demonstrate that a Unification process which retained Australia's current 700 or so local governments is certainly feasible. The fourth section then presents a compilation of selected literature extracts on significant scales of human organisation, with an emphasis on Australia and Australia's government structure.

Significant Scales of Organisation for Australians and Australian Governments

Table 2E-1 below lists significant scales of human organisation of particular relevance to Australia, ranging from the scale of an individual person through household, sub-national, national and supra-national scales and eventually to the global scale, where the pre-eminent scales of the individual person and the world as a whole can substantially coincide in the notion of universal human rights and responsibilities (see, for example, Langlois 1998: 12-17; Caney and Jones 2000; Moore 2002; 2003). Scales are presented in ascending order by population, with approximations for accompanying land areas also provided. The LP values, calculated as

the base 10 logarithms of actual or typical populations (P), are included to facilitate order of magnitude comparisons.

Table 2E-1: Significant Scales of Human Organisation in Australia and Generally

Level	Scale	Typical Population Range	Approximate Actual or Typical Population (P)	LP = $\log_{10}(P)$	Approximate Actual or Typical Land Area
<i>Australian Sub-National</i>	INDIV = individual	1	1	0	100 m ²
	HOUSH = household or family	1 to 10	3	0.5	100 m ² to 10 km ²
	NEIGHD = immediate neighbourhood, clan or extended family	10 to 1,000	100	2.0	1,000 m ² to 100 km ²
	WNHD = wider neighbourhood or sub-tribe	100 to 10,000	1,000	3.0	10,000 m ² to 1,000 km ²
	LOC = locality, suburb, town or tribe	1000 to 100,000	10,000	4.0	0.1 km ² to 10,000 km ²
	AVELG = average Australian local government	27,000	27,000	4.4	10,000 km ²
	REG = sub-national region (metropolitan or provincial)	10,000 to 1,000,000	100,000	5.0	1 km ² to 1,000,000 km ²
	NT = Northern Territory (Australia's least populous STU)	200,000	200,000	5.3	1,352,158 km ²
	BRISCC = Brisbane City Council (Australia's most populous local government unit)	900,000	900,000	6.0	1,327 km ²
	METRO = large metropolitan region	250,000 to 4,000,000	1,000,000	6.0	1,000 km ² to 10,000 km ²
	STUAVE = average population of the eight STUs	2,500,000	2,500,000	6.4	3,000 to 3,000,000 km ²
	NSW = New South Wales (Australia's most populous STU)	6,500,000	6,600,000	6.8	801,353 km ²
<i>National</i>	AUS = Country / Australia	19,500,000	19,500,000	7.3	7,703,300 km ²
<i>Supra-National</i>	OCEA = Oceania	31,000,000	30,000,000	7.5	9,000,000 km ²
	OECD	1,100,000,000	1,000,000,000	9	35,000,000 km ²
	ASPAC = Asia-Pacific	3,800,000,000	4,000,000,000	9.6	50,000,000 km ²
	WORLD = Whole World	6,100,000,000	6,000,000,000	9.8	140,000,000 km ²

Notes: Populations are 2001 approximations based data from the ABS (2001 Census), the OECD and the United Nations. According to the ABS (2001 Census), the average Australian household consisted of 2.8 people and the average family 3.1 people.

Figure 2E-1 provides a visual representation of the scales in Table 2E-1 above, in terms of the population logarithm LP. The scales shaded with horizontal stripes are those which represent definite scales of pre-eminent relevance to Australia in the form of the world, Australia and selected Australian sub-national government units.


Figure 2E-1: Scales of Human and Political Organisation of Relevance to Australia

Table 2E-1 and Figure 2E-1 suggest that Australia's most populous sub-national governments, at both STU and local government levels, serve significant fractions of Australia's overall population, as indicated by the fact that the LP values for NSW, the average STU and Brisbane City Council are all within 1.3 of the Australia-wide value. Because NSW has approximately one-third of Australia's total population and the base 10 logarithm of one-third is -0.5 , the NSW LP value of 6.8 is just 0.5 below the Australian 7.3 value. The STU average LP of 6.4 is also within 1.0 of the Australian LP value of 7.3, because there are just eight STUs and the base 10 logarithm of 8 is 0.90, which is less than 1.00, so Australia's STUs on average serve populations which are within a decimal order of magnitude of Australia's total population. It is also clear that scales of organisation involving 10,000 people or less (so $LP = 4.0$ or less) have little political representation in the Australian system of government. These comparisons hence support the argument that Australia's current STUs, because they are only eight in number, are generally too large in population and land area alike to provide scales of government which are (1) close to the people in a substantive sense, and (2) sufficiently different from the Australia-wide scale to be worth preserving.

Australia's Gigantic Sub-national Government Units

Australia's current eight STUs and nearly 700 local governments serve vastly differing populations and land areas. Whereas NSW has about one-third of Australia's population,

Western Australia similarly occupies about one-third of Australia's total land area. Only nine countries in the world have a land area exceeding that of Western Australia (Russia, Canada, the United States, China, Brazil, Australia, India, Argentina and Kazakhstan), only 16 have land areas larger than Queensland's, and only 18 have land areas larger than that of the Northern Territory. Australia's largest local government units are similarly gigantic. East Pilbara Shire in Western Australia, Australia's largest local government by area, serves a land area of 379,00 km² and a population of 7000 (Australian Local Government Association website, last updated July 2005, accessed July 2006). East Pilbara's land area is greater than that of VIC, TAS, ACT, and 132 of the 191 United Nations member countries including Japan, Germany, Malaysia, Italy, the Philippines, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (CIA World Factbook 2005, at www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html, accessed July 2006). Only three European countries (excluding partly Asian Russia and Turkey) have land areas exceeding East Pilbara's: France (547,000 km²), Spain (505,000 km²) and Sweden (450,000 km²).

Australia Compared to the Three Most Populous American States

Two falsehoods which have hampered past assessments of Australia's current government structure and alternative structures alike, and which contribute to the motivation for this study, are the claims that (1) Australia has an unusually large number of local governments, and (2) a unitary system of government in which Australia's nearly 700 local governments are retained is totally without precedent and hence and otherwise totally unworkable. This section provides comparisons and assessments designed to dispel these myths and generally guide further consideration of Australia's current government structure and alternative structures considered in this study. Whereas other studies have focused on savings possible through local government amalgamation and reorganisation generally, including several discussed in Chapter 3 (and in more detail in Appendix 3G), this present study focuses on rearrangement at the Commonwealth and State-Territory levels, so for most of the alternative government structures considered in this thesis it is assumed that Australia's local government numbers will remain at current levels. The comparisons in this section show that Australia doesn't have an excessive number of local governments relative to other countries, and that it is therefore sound to assume that Australia's local government numbers will remain unchanged.

Most Australian Unification proposals have been accompanied by plans to establish regional or provincial governments, often numbering 20 to 50 or so (see Figures 3C-2 and 3C-3 in Appendix 3C, for example), but Unification could also be achieved relatively simply through

the amalgamation of Australia's Commonwealth, State and Territory governments into a single national government, otherwise leaving local governments unchanged. The Unification model resulting from such a coalescence is defined as the *National Current Local* (NCL) model in Chapter 9 and is considered extensively in Part III of this thesis. Whilst such a model may seem too unwieldy and generally unsatisfactory for Australia because of the difficulty to effectively coordinate between a single national government and Australia's nearly 700 local governments, Australia's local governments are far from excessively numerous when compared with other countries, including most federal and unitary countries, and many American States, as shown in Tables 2D-18 and 2D-19 in Appendix 2D, Table 3G-3 in Appendix 3G (see the entry for the U.S. Census Bureau 2004: 14), Table 6A-14 in Appendix 6A, and Table 2E-2 below.

Table 2E-2: Australia and American States with Populations Matching or Exceeding that of Australia in 2000

Political Unit	P = Approximate Population in April 2000	A = Total Surface Area Including Water (km ²)	Number of Counties	N = Number of Local Governments (municipalities or townships in the US)	LGP = Average Local Government Population (LGP = P ÷ N)	LLA = Average Local Government Land Area (km ²) (LLA = A ÷ N)
Australia	19 million	7,703,300	n/a	686	28,000	11,000
California	34 million	424,000	57	475 (municipalities)	72,000	900
Texas	21 million	696,000	254	1196 (municipalities)	18,000	600
New York	19 million	141,000	57	1545 (616 municipalities and 929 townships)	12,000	90

Sources: ABS for Australian data; U.S. Census Bureau (2004a), *2002 Census of Governments, Volume 3, Number 2, Compendium of Public Employment: 2002*, Table 10, p. 14; U.S. Census Bureau (2004b), *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2003*, Section 6: Geography and Environment, p. Table No. 359, p. 225.

Table 2E-2 compares Australia with California, Texas and New York, the three American States with populations that exceed or approximately match that of Australia, and shows that California, Texas and New York have land areas significantly smaller than Australia's 7.7 million km², and host county government structures absent in Australia. Texas' total surface area is nearly 90% as great as that of NSW (801,000 km²), California's is nearly twice that of Victoria (228,000 km²), and New York's is nearly two-thirds that of Victoria. Texas and New York have populations approximately matching that of Australia but significantly more local governments than Australia, whereas California has nearly twice Australia's population and more than two-thirds as many local governments as Australia. Australia's local governments on average serve much larger land areas than those of California, Texas and New York, and larger populations than those of Texas and New York, but smaller populations than those of California.

This thesis does not seek to endorse a specific Unification model for Australia, nor any other particular model, but it does seek to overcome the clearly invalid view that a Unification model comprising a national government and local governments in more or less current numbers is totally without precedent and unworkable for Australia. Table 2E-2 demonstrates that such a Unification model is certainly feasible in view of the current operation of similar unitary models in California, New York and Texas, though it is acknowledged that Australia lacks the counties and other regional government structures possessed by most American States and many European countries. Table 2E-2 together with Tables 2D-18, 2D-19, 3G-3 and 6A-14 from other appendices, as noted above, suggest that local governments in large numbers could well be retained in an Australia without States in their current form, and that regional units resembling the counties and similar units in American States and European countries might be worth considering for Australia.

Selected Literature Extracts on Significant Scales of Human Organisation

Table 2E-3 below contains 27 extracts from books, reports and papers, from 1957 through to 2005, which describe significant scales of human organisation ranging from individual people to the global scale.

Table 2E-3: Extracts on Significant Scales

Literature Source	Selected Extracts
<p>Whitlam, E. G. (1957), 'The Constitution Versus Labor', in E. G. Whitlam (1977), <i>On Australia's Constitution</i>, Widescope, Melbourne, pp. 15-45.</p>	<p>Whitlam (1957: 33): There are few functions which the State Parliaments now perform which would not be better performed by the Australian Parliament or by regional councils. The States are too large to deal with local matters and too small and weak to deal with national ones. Three-quarters of the acts which each State Parliament passes are repetitions of the acts which each State Parliament passes. The same applies to regulations gazetted by each State government. Most of this legislation does not refer to local matters but to matter which are the same from one end of Australia to the other. ... The present State boundaries were imposed on Australians a century ago from Westminster. There is no economic reason for preserving them. They merely serve to maintain the domination of the commercial and political interests which are centred in the State capitals.</p>
<p>König, R. (1968), <i>The Community</i>, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.</p>	<p>König (1968: 1): There can hardly be any doubt that the local community (<i>Gemeinde</i>) is, together with the family, one of the most important basic forms of society. ... In addition, there is the fundamental confusion which exists between the community (<i>Germeinde</i>) as an administrative unit and the community as a social reality ...</p> <p>König (1968: 2): Further, spatial proximity which we shall meet as an important (though often exaggerated) factor in the relationship of men in a community, appears of less decisive importance as a bond between men than kinship or culture. Very often the neighbourhood factor operates only with and through these other media. This would seem to indicate a lesser universality for the community as a local association by comparison specifically with the family, and with other forms of kinship including the clan, kin and the tribe.</p> <p>König (1968: 26-27):</p>

... three important elements of which are mentioned by Hillery: local unity, social interaction and common bonds.

...

Following on from our previous observations let us now attempt to arrive at a preliminary definition of the term community, one which can subsequently be extended in various directions. A community is first of all a global society of a local unit type embracing an indefinite multiplicity of functional spheres, social groups and other social phenomena, and conditioning innumerable forms of social interaction, joint bonds, and value concepts. Further, apart from numerous forms of inner relationships which may exist in the previously mentioned parts, it will also, and as a matter of course, have its own tangible institutional and organizational external structure. From this alone it is already quite clear that groupings of the type 'family, neighbourhood, community, profession' (such as can be met with again and again) are completely inadmissible since they treat incomparables as though they were on a par. The community is thus under all circumstances a global society, and therefore a term of a superior order to family, neighbourhood, profession, etc., because it includes all these phenomena and groups within itself (together with many others, for instance, social classes). Precisely for this reason it cannot be mentioned in the same breath with them, since on account of its specific structural character it is in a category above them all.

From such a complex definition, which puts local unity, social interactions and common values and ties at the head, it can be seen at once that the administrative aspect of the community is, though not completely effaced, nevertheless pushed so far into the background that it becomes relatively unimportant for the essential definition. In the foreground is the community as a social reality; and it is undoubtedly something quite different from the community as an administrative unit. This principle is quite generally applicable; that is to say, it is independent of any special traditions which may exist in Continental Europe, Great Britain or the United States. A community as an administrative unit need not necessarily be a community as a social unit in the sociological sense.

König (1968: 28):

Thus as far as we are concerned, the community appears as a 'social system'; that is to say a relationship which is characterized, amongst other things, by the fact that the people concerned are conscious of the relationships, conscious of its limits, and conscious of its differences from other similar relationships.

König (1968: 43):

THE COMMUNITY AS A GLOBAL SOCIETY ON A LOCAL BASIS

The Principle of Neighbourhood

ON THE TOO NARROW OR TOO WIDE USE OF THE TERM COMMUNITY

When we, as suggested above, term the community a global society on a local basis, then at the same time it must be distinguished both from larger relationships of, say, a regional (area, province) or national character on a territorial basis (commonwealth), and also from smaller phenomena, which do not have the character of global societies. ... We have already stressed the extreme elasticity of the English term community. It can include anything from a relationship of two persons to the total relationship of humanity (the community of mankind).

König (1968: 97; see also 147-150):

In addition, the function of the local newspaper is of the greatest importance in the community and has a great influence on its integration, as Morris Janowitz [1952] has already pointed out.

König (1968: 151):

HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION

...

Horizontal integration relates above all to the cooperation of groups in the spatial order, and, accordingly, on the same status level; vertical integration, on the other hand, runs from below to above. In both directions there are greater and lesser degrees, but only when the two aspects of integration run simultaneously in both directions can we speak of any real integration.

Table 2E-3 (Continued)

Literature Source	Selected Extracts
<p>Alexander, C., Ishikawa, S., Silverstein, M., Jacobson, M., Fiksdahl-King, I. and Angel, S. (1977), <i>A Pattern Language: Towns, Buildings, Construction</i>, Oxford University Press, New York.</p>	<p>Alexander et al. (1977: 4):</p> <p>1. The core of the planning process we propose is this: The region is made up of a hierarchy of social and political groups, from the smallest and most local groups – families, neighbourhoods, and work groups – to the largest groups – city councils, regional assemblies.</p> <p>Imagine for example a metropolitan region composed very roughly of the following groups, each group a coherent political entity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. The region: 8,000,000 people. B. The major city: 500,000 people. C. Communities and small towns: 5–10,000 people each. D. Neighbourhoods: 500–1000 people each. E. House clusters and work communities: 30–50 people each. F. Families and work groups: 1–15 people each. <p>Alexander et al. (1977: 11-12):</p> <p>1. There are natural limits to the size of groups that can govern themselves in a human way. The biologist J. B. S. Haldane has remarked on this in his paper, "On Being the Right Size":</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">... just as there is a best size for every animal, so the same is true for every human institution. In the Greek type of democracy all the citizens could listen to a series of orators and vote directly on questions of legislation. Hence their philosophers held that a small city was the largest possible democratic state ... (J. B. S. Haldane, "On Being the right Size," <i>The World of Mathematics, Vol. II</i>, J. R. Newman, ed. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956, pp. 962-67).</p> <p>It is not hard to see why the government of a region becomes less and less manageable with size. In a population of N persons, there are of the order of N^2 [$N(N-1)/2$ to be exact] person-to-person links needed to keep channels of communication open. Naturally, when N goes beyond a certain limit, the channels of communication needed for democracy and justice and information are simply too clogged, and too complex; bureaucracy overwhelms human processes.</p> <p>And, of course, as N grows the number of levels in the hierarchy of government increases too. In small countries like Denmark there are so few levels, that any private citizen can have access to the Minister for Education. But this kind of direct access is quite impossible in larger countries like England or the United States.</p> <p>We believe the limits are reached when the population of a region reaches some 2 to 10 million. Beyond this size, people become remote from the large-scale processes of government. Our estimate may seem extraordinary in the light of modern history: the nation-states have grown mightily and their governments hold power over tens of millions, sometimes hundreds of millions, of people. But these huge powers cannot claim to have a natural size.</p> <p>They cannot claim to have struck the balance between the needs of towns and communities, and the needs of the world community as a whole. Indeed, their tendency has been to override local needs and repress local culture, and at the same time aggrandize themselves to the point where they are out of reach, their power barely conceivable to the average citizen.</p> <p>Alexander et al. (1977: 71-72):</p> <p>Individuals have no effective voice in any community of more than 5000-10,000 persons.</p> <p>People can only have a genuine effect on local government when the units of local government are autonomous, self-governing, self-budgeting communities, which are small enough to create the possibility of an immediate link between the man in the street and his local officials and elected representatives.</p> <p>This is an old idea. It was the model for Athenian democracy in the third and fourth centuries B.C.; it was Jefferson's plan for American democracy; it was the tack Confucius took in his book on government, <i>The Great Digest</i>.</p> <p>For these people, the practice of exercising power over local matters was itself an experience of intrinsic satisfaction. Sophocles wrote that life would be unbearable were it not for the freedom to initiate action in a small community. And it was considered that this experience was not only good in itself, but was the only way of governing that would not lead to corruption. Jefferson wanted to spread out the power not because "the people" were so bright and clever, but precisely because they were prone to error, and it was therefore dangerous to vest power in the hands of a few who would inevitably make big mistakes. "Break the country into wards" was his campaign slogan, so that the mistakes will be manageable and people will get practice and improve.</p> <p>Today the distance between people and the centers of power that govern them is vast – both psychologically and geographically. Milton Kotler, a Jeffersonian, has described the experience:</p>

The process of city administration is invisible to the citizen who sees little evidence of its human components but feels the sharp pain of taxation. With increasingly poor public service, his desires and needs are more insistently expressed. Yet his expressions of need seem to issue into thin air, for government does not appear attentive to his demands. This disjunction between citizen and government is the major political problem of city government, because it embodies the dynamics of civil disorder. ... (Milton Kotler, Neighbourhood Foundations, Memorandum # 24; "Neighbourhood corporations and the reorganization of city government," unpub. Ms., August 1967.)

There are two ways in which the physical environment, as it is now ordered, promotes and sustains the separation between citizens and their government. First, the size of the political community is so large that its members are separated from its leaders simply by their number. Second, government is invisible, physically located out of the realm of most citizens' daily lives. Unless these two conditions are altered, political alienation is not likely to be overcome.

1. *The size of the political community.* It is obvious that the larger the community the greater the distance between the average citizen and the heads of government. Paul Goodman has proposed a rule of thumb, based on cities like Athens in their prime, that no citizen be more than two friends away from the highest member of the local unit. Assume that everyone knows about 12 people in his local community. Using this notion and Goodman's rule we can see that an optimum size for a political community would be about 12^3 or 1728 households or 5500 persons. This figure corresponds to an old Chicago school estimate of 5000. And it is the same order of magnitude as the size of ECCO, the neighbourhood corporation in Columbus, Ohio, of 6000 to 7000, described by Kotler (*Committee on Government Operations*, U.S. Senate, 89th Congress, Second Session, Part 9, December 1966).

The editors of *The Ecologist* have a similar intuition about the proper size for units of local government. (See their *Blueprint for Survival*, Penguin Books, 1972, pp. 50-55.) And Terence Lee, in his study, "Urban neighbourhood as a socio-spatial schema," *Ekistics* 177, August 1970, gives evidence for the importance of the spatial community. Lee gives 75 acres as a natural size for a community. At 25 persons per acre, such a community would accommodate some 2000 persons; at 60 persons per acre, some 4500.

Table 2E-3 (Continued)

Literature Source	Selected Extracts
Larkin, R. P., Peters, G. L., and Exline, C. H. (1981), <i>People, Environment, and Place: An Introduction to Human Geography</i> , Charles E Merrill, Columbus.	<p>Larkin et al. (1981: 81):</p> <p>In the study of culture, one of the most important questions to be asked is at what scale, or level of detail, should the investigation be undertaken: with the individual, the group, region, nation, or even the inhabitants of a continent. As larger areas and cultural groups are observed there is an attendant need to become more general; however, if the unit of observation is extremely restricted, then conclusions with broad applications are difficult to generate.</p>
Kirby, A. (1985), 'Pseudo-random thoughts on space, scale and ideology in political geography', <i>Political Geography Quarterly</i> , Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1985, pp. 5-18.	<p>Kirby (1985: 11-12):</p> <p>The way forward from this dilemma is to begin to construct coherent spatial scales which have some social significance, as with Taylor's (1982) trichotomy of the scales of experience, ideology and reality. Of these, the latter is constituted by the globe and its interlocking economic system, which functions essentially as a capitalist world-economy. There have been criticisms of this assumption but it can hardly be denied that all subglobal economies have been penetrated by capitalist production (see Taylor, 1983b: 300-303, for a concise account).</p> <p>As soon as we attempt to shift from this scale, we encounter problems. Taylor argues that nation-states are coherent units, insofar as they constitute ideological units, i.e. they are economic, social and political territories which have evolved a particular ideological stability. This must be open to question, however, in that many nation-states have in fact surrendered their ideological integrity by joining with other nations to form larger political units (the EEC is the best example: see also Short, 1982). In one sense, we can argue that a nation-state which surrenders its legal codes has lost one of its constituent parts (Miliband, 1973). On occasion, then, the nation-state may be in flux, and may require further definition.</p> <p>Even larger problems are encountered when we evaluate Taylor's third scale, namely the scale of experience. This is intended to be the 'local' scale, although this remains unidentified; it is clearly unsatisfactory to use simply the term 'urban', as Taylor does, for this immediately excludes non-urban areas from consideration, which cannot be his intention.</p> <p>We are at this juncture firmly within the dilemma identified above: what is the local scale?</p> <p>According to Kirby (1985: 13-14):</p> <p>... any emphasis placed upon the local state is seen as an <i>integration</i> rather than an elevation of any particular spatial scale. Scattered political actions take place within some jurisdiction, and usually involve that unit, be it a school board or a metropolitan government. In turn, many policies operated by local state units are in some manner directed, limited or controlled by the central state or even some larger body. Thus, by locating action-in-place within the arena of the local state, we build up the links that stretch from individuals to local jurisdictions through to central authorities (these links can also include, of course, links with production units, national corporations, national economic policies, and so on).</p> <p>Kirby (1985: 15):</p> <p>Local state units, for example, may be inordinately large, in which case they effectively serve to constrict local politics (see Kirby, 1983a, Fig. 1). This notwithstanding, the local state – as a spatial unit or a spatial scale – has legal and political meaning, and is explicitly linked with the state, which is generally regarded as the key (spatial) unit within political geography. In this way, we may begin to integrate action at the local level with affairs within society as a whole.</p>

Table 2E-3 (Continued)



Literature Source	Selected Extracts
<p>Leimgruber, W. (1991), 'Boundary, values and identity: The Swiss-Italian transborder region', in Rumley, D. and Minghi, J. V. (eds), <i>The Geography of Border Landscapes</i>, Routledge, London and New York.</p>	<p>Leimgruber (1991: 44-45):</p> <p>Nobody would doubt the fact that boundaries are essentially human creations. Even physiographic boundaries can be considered as such since nature rarely (if ever) draws clear border lines [see e.g. Racek 1983: 28]. It is people who perceive differences and establish boundaries. ... Environmental psychology teaches us that this phenomenon is fundamental to human beings: each has their different personal space (Figure 3.1) which is defined by gestures, dwelling space, activity space, and so on (Moles and Rohmer, 1972), and each constitutes a 'territory'.</p> <p>Figure 3.1 The human shell-like spatial hierarchy</p>  <p>Source: after Moles and Rohmer, 1972: 41ff. [Moles A. A. and Rohmer, E. (1972) <i>Psychologie de l'Espace</i> (Paris: PUF)]</p> <p>Notes: 1 The human body. 2 The range of gestures. 3 The room in the apartment. 4 The apartment/the house. 5 The neighbourhood/the village. 6 The town/the central place. 7 The region.</p>
<p>Taylor, P. J. (1991), 'Political Geography Within World-systems Analysis', <i>Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center</i>, Vol. 14, Summer 1991, pp. 387-402.</p>	<p>Taylor (1991: 393-394):</p> <p>One common denominator of the revived political geography from 1975 onwards was the ubiquitous use of geographical scale as an organizing frame. Nearly all books of the period used a three-scale structure of local/urban, national/state, and international/global. This organization was treated as unproblematic, but in world-systems analysis both a general rationale for using geographic scales, and a particular interpretation for these three scales of analysis, could be found. It was noted that political geography's three scale structure pivoted around the state. From this observation was derived an interpretation of the state level as a scale of ideology separating the local scales of experience from the global scale of systemic reality.</p> <p>Taylor (1991: 397):</p> <p>Most political analyses are state-centric in nature. World-systems analysis is just one of several social scientific projects that are trying to move inquiry beyond the state. In political geography a second attack on state-centric analyses has come in the form of locality studies that emphasize differences in the politics of places within state territories.</p> <p>Taylor (1991: 398):</p> <p>World-systems analysis in general is much more than analysis at a scale beyond the state. At the heart of politics in the capitalist world-economy there is an "institutional vortex" in which four institutions – states, peoples, classes, and households – interact upon one another to produce and reproduce the "moral life," or superstructure, of the system (Wallerstein, 1984). States are the legal entities in which formal power resides. People are cultural status groups (races, nations, ethnic groups) which have provided subjective identities. Classes are the objective economic strata of the system. Households are the basic "atoms" of the system where small income-pooling groups have budget plans ranging from daily survival to intergenerational inheritance of capital. All individuals are members of concrete races, classes, households, etc. Note that in this analysis the states constitute just one of four basic institutions.</p>
<p>Rosenau, J. N. (1992), 'The Relocation of Authority in a Shrinking World', <i>Comparative Politics</i>, Vol. 24, No. 3, April 1992, pp. 253-272.</p>	<p>Rosenau (1992: 270):</p> <p>Traces of these cyclical fluctuations, in which global tendencies toward centralization foster countertendencies toward decentralization and vice versa, are readily discernible. ... The predominant trend still appears to be a decentralizing one, and it is reinforced by a worldwide momentum in the direction of free market economies and their encouragement of individual enterprise, but signs of a new cycle can be cited by those who see a global need to focus on collective problems.</p>

Table 2E-3 (Continued)

Literature Source	Selected Extracts
<p>Delaney, D. and Leitner, H. (1997), 'The Political Construction of Scale', <i>Political Geography</i>, Vol. 16, No. 2, February 1997, pp. 93-97.</p>	<p>Delaney and Leitner (1997: 93):</p> <p>Geographic scale, referring to the nested hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing size, such as the local, regional, national and global, is a familiar and taken-for-granted concept for political geographers and political analysts. In much contemporary analysis of political organization and action, geographic scale is treated simply as different levels of analysis (from local to global) in which the investigation of political processes is set. Recently this notion of geographic scale as an unproblematic, pre-given and fixed hierarchy of bounded spaces has been challenged. Geographers have shown that the geographic scale at which, for example, economic activities and political authority are constituted, is not fixed but periodically transformed (Smith and Dennis, 1987; Herod, 1991). Attention has been drawn to the relations between, and influences of, processes operating at different geographic scales (such as the local and global), and how they interact to produce incentives and motives for political action (Miller, 1994).</p> <p>...</p> <p>The common ground of this body of research is that geographic scale is conceptualized as socially constructed rather than ontologically pre-given, and that the geographic scales constructed are themselves implicated in the construction of social, economic and political processes.</p>
<p>Golledge, R. G. and Stimson, R. J. (1997), <i>Spatial Behavior: A Geographic Perspective</i>, The Guilford Press, New York.</p>	<p>Golledge and Stimson (1997: 261-262):</p> <p>7.11.1 Distinguishing between Subjective and Objective Distance</p> <p>In the cognitive mapping process, information is accumulated about relative locations and degrees of connectivity of environmental cues. The term <i>cognitive distance</i> has evolved to describe the relative spatial separation of objects in a cognitive map.</p> <p>One of the earlier examples of applying the concept of cognitive distance occurred in the consumer behavior area (Thompson, 1963). In this context, <i>subjective distance</i> estimates were incorporated into conventional gravity models to help explain store choice. Along with this applied interest there developed a basic research interest in the concept of cognitive distance (Golledge et al., 1969, 1972; Lowrey, 1970; Burroughs & Sadalla, 1979; Sadalla & Staplin, 1980a). In most cases a curvilinear relationship was seen to occur between subjective and objective distance (see Figure 7.16).</p> <p>...</p> <p>Early investigations of cognitive distance produced some apparently contradictory results. Lee (1962) found that distances outward from the centre of the Scottish city of Dundee were overestimated more than inward distances. Golledge et al. (1969), among others, found the distances toward downtown in U.S. cities were overestimated, whereas those towards the periphery were underestimated. Some reasons for the apparent differences were related to the size and functional complexity of the cities in question and also possibly to their internal structure (e.g., whether or not they had many regional shopping centers). Thus differences in the nature of the local environment and its regional or cultural setting also proved to be a critical factor in the estimate of cognitive distance.</p> <p>Figure 7.16. Relationship between cognitive distance and physical distance.</p> 
<p>Swyngedouw, E. (1997), 'Neither Global nor Local: "Glocalization" and the Politics of Scale', in Cox, K. R. (ed.), <i>Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local</i>, The Guilford Press, New York, pp. 137-166.</p>	<p>Swyngedouw (1997: 137-138):</p> <p>In short, the local and the global are mutually constituted, or so it seems. But of course, the preceding examples do not give indications of the intertwining of just local and global processes. Other spatial scales are also deeply implicated in these events as well.</p> <p>Swyngedouw (1997: 140):</p> <p>Of course, there are local and global processes, but also processes that are regional, national, European, and so forth. The crux is not, therefore, whether the local or the global has theoretical and empirical priority in shaping the conditions of daily life, but rather how the local, the global, and other relevant (though perpetually shifting) geographical scale levels are the result, the product of processes, of sociospatial change (Cox & Mair, 1991; Smith, 1984). In other words, spatial scale is what needs to be understood as something that is produced; a process that is always deeply heterogeneous, conflictual and contested. Scale becomes the arena and moment, both discursively and materially, where sociospatial power relations are contested and compromises are negotiated and regulated. Scale, therefore, is both the</p>

result and the outcome of social struggle for power and control.

Swyngedouw (1997: 140-142):

Scalar spatial configurations, whether physical, ecological, in terms of regulatory order(s), or as discursive representations, are always already a result, an outcome, of the perpetual movement of the flux of sociospatial dynamics. The theoretical and political priority, therefore, never resides in a particular geographical scale, but rather in the process through which particular scales become (re)constituted. Struggling for the command over a particular scale can, in a given sociospatial conjuncture, be of eminent importance.

Spatial scales are never fixed, but are perpetually redefined, contested, and reconstructed in terms of their extent, content, relative importance, and interrelations. For example, the present struggle over whether the scale of social, labor, environmental, and monetary regulation within the European Union should be local, national, or European indicates how particular geographical scales of regulation are perpetually contested and transformed. Clearly, relative social power positions will vary considerably depending on who controls what at which scale. The struggle for equal rights in the European labor markets for men and women is another example of a deeply scaled process. Consider, for example, how Britain's opt-out from the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty leaves a whole range of social regulatory issues in the hands of a decidedly conservative English national elite and allows the intensification of a wage-cost competition within the European Union (EU). All this suggests that the continuous reshuffling and reorganization of spatial scales is an integral part of social strategies and struggles for control and empowerment. In a context of heterogeneous social and ecological regulations, organized at the local, regional, or national level, mobile people, goods, and capital and hypermobile information flows permeate and transgress these scales in ways that are often deeply exclusive and disempowering for those operating at other scale levels.

...

As I have argued elsewhere, for example, recent political-economic transformations are characterized by a parallel and simultaneous movement to the smaller and the larger scale, to the local and the global (a "glocalization" process) (Swyngedouw, 1992a, 1992b). This process does not in itself assign greater validity to a global or a local perspective, but alerts us to a series of sociospatial processes that changes the importance and role of certain geographical scales, re-asserts the importance of others, and sometimes creates entirely new significant scales. Most importantly, however, these scale redefinitions alter and express changes in the geometry of social power by strengthening the power and the control of some while disempowering others (see also Swyngedouw, 1989). This is the process that Smith (1993) refers to as the "jumping of scales", a process that signals how politics are spatialized by mechanisms of stretching and contracting objects across a space.

This [stretching process] is a process driven by class, ethnic, gender and cultural struggles. On the one hand, domineering organizations attempt to control the dominated by confining the latter and their organizations to a manageable scale. On the other hand, subordinated groups attempt to liberate themselves from these imposed scale constraints by harnessing power and instrumentalities at other scales. In the process, scale is actively produced. (Jonas, 1994, p. 258)

These scales are, of course, not operating hierarchically but simultaneously, and the relationships between different scales are "nested" (Jonas, 1994, p. 261; Smith, 1984, 1993). Clearly, social power along gender, class, ethnic, or ecological lines refers to the scale capabilities of individuals and social groups. As power shifts, scale configurations change both in terms of their nesting and interrelations and in terms of their spatial extent.

Swyngedouw (1997: 144-145):

The scaling of the everyday, as Smith (1993) insists, is expressed in bodily, community, urban, regional, national, supranational, and global configurations whose content and relations are fluid, contested, and perpetually transgressed. ... In sum, as Smith (1984, 1993) points out, scale mediates between cooperation and competition, between homogenization and differentiation, between empowerment and disempowerment.

Swyngedouw (1997: 159-160):

The transformative continuation of sociospatial relations that operates through deeply empowering-disempowering mechanisms produces a nested set of related and interpenetrating spatial scales that define the arena of struggle, where conflict is mediated and regulated and compromises settled. Sociospatial struggle and political strategizing, therefore, often revolve around scale issues, and shifting balances of power are often associated with a profound rearticulation of scales or the production of an altogether new gestalt of scale. The sociospatial transformations that have characterized the past 2 decades or so are testimony to those scale restructurings through which older power relations are transformed. The disturbing effects of these recent glocalization processes suggest that the spaces of the circulation of capital have been upscaled, while regulating the production-consumption nexus has been downscaled, shifting the balance of power in important polarizing, or often plain exclusive, ways.

Table 2E-3 (Continued)

Literature Source	Selected Extracts
<p data-bbox="217 656 411 887">Aplin, G. (1998), <i>Australians and their Environment: An Introduction to Environmental Studies</i>, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia.</p>	<p data-bbox="427 275 866 327">Aplin (1998: 17-18): The space-time context and questions of scale</p> <p data-bbox="427 344 1393 450">Environmental issues are not isolated in either space or time. Events occurring in the past are affecting us now, and things we do or do not do now will affect us or our descendants in the future. Just as importantly, things we do now may well affect other people in many other places, both now and in the future.</p> <p data-bbox="427 468 1321 495">Furthermore, events at one spatial scale have repercussions at other scales (Figure 1.6) [as below].</p> <div data-bbox="432 517 1066 1016"> <p>The diagram illustrates five interconnected scales of environmental action:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> NATIONAL SCALE: Emission standards, Heritage legislation, Taxation measures. WORLD REGION SCALE: Regional Seas Programme, Fisheries agreements, Migratory wildlife protection. STATE OR REGIONAL SCALE: Transport, water, waste disposal policies; Pollution licensing or control; Regional planning; Resource management. LOCAL SCALE: Land use planning; Recycling; Public health measures; Farm management. GLOBAL SCALE: Treaties, conventions, etc. involving most nations and/or the UN. <p>Arrows indicate complex interactions between these scales, showing that actions at one level can have significant impacts at others.</p> </div> <p data-bbox="427 1061 922 1084">Figure 1.6 Selected environmental decisions and actions at various scales</p> <p data-bbox="427 1113 1393 1267">For example, local environmental issues often have regional, national and even international repercussions. At the same time, national and international events, whether they be economic, political or biophysical, can affect the local environment, economy and society. All scales are thus potentially interconnected, and decisions made at one might well have unwanted side effects at others if the interactions between them are not taken into account. It is also important to realise that interactions between scales are more complex than the common representation of a hierarchy of scales suggests.</p>
<p data-bbox="217 1335 411 1742">Linklater, A. (1998), 'Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian European State', in Archibugi, D., Held, D. and Kohler, M. (eds), <i>Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy</i>, Stanford University Press.</p>	<p data-bbox="427 1272 683 1299">Linklater (1998: 132-133):</p> <p data-bbox="427 1317 1393 1444">One central theme runs through all four areas of discussion – the possibility of remaking political communities to achieve levels of universality and diversity which modern states invariably discouraged under conditions of geopolitical rivalry and the high risk of interstate war. In the new international environment it is both possible and desirable to realize higher levels of universality and diversity by moving beyond the sovereign territorial state.</p> <p data-bbox="427 1462 1393 1800">The argument in favour of reconstructing citizenship in the post-Westphalian state supports the claim that although citizenship is one of the central achievements of modern states, it is both 'too puffed up and too compressed': too puffed up because the needs of those who do not share their dominant political culture have frequently been disregarded; too compressed because the interests of outsiders have generally been ignored [Wright 1990: 32]. The argument set out here builds on the claim that modern states should 'go higher in [the] search for citizenship, but also lower and wider. Higher to the world, lower to the locality' [Wright 1990: 32]. Higher forms of citizenship include rights of participation in supranational structures and the international protection of the individual's legal and welfare rights. Lower forms of citizenship entail increasing the power of local communities and subnational groups. Higher and lower forms of citizenship can be integrated by granting subnational and substate groups the right of appeal to international bodies and parallel forms of representation in international institutions. ... Various forces are loosening the grip of the nation-state so that a wider range of political identities and authorities can unfold.</p>

Table 2E-3 (Continued)

Literature Source	Selected Extracts
<p>MacLeod, G. (1998), 'In what sense a region? Place hybridity, symbolic shape, and institutional formation in (post-) modern Scotland', <i>Political Geography</i>, Vol. 17, No. 7, pp. 833-863.</p>	<p>MacLeod (1998: 833):</p> <p>One of the most explicit statements in this 'reconstructed regional geography' emanates from Anssi Paasi, who seeks to develop a framework for understanding how regions emerge, and are continually reproduced and transformed in and through the practices of individuals and institutions at a variety of spatial levels. This emphasis on the wider sociospatial structure and collective consciousness of 'society' helps to foreground issues of spatial scale, boundaries, institutional formation and cultural identity. ...</p> <p>MacLeod (1998: 836-838):</p> <p>The region as a 'historically contingent process' of institutionalisation</p> <p>The key research objective of Paasi and his colleagues is to develop the theoretical and conceptual tools to help understand how regions, or territories, emerge, how they continue to exist, and (perhaps eventually) disappear on various spatial scales. And furthermore, to assess how these geographical scales are connected to a network of over-lapping social practices (Paasi <i>et al.</i>, 1994). At the outset, it is vital to stress that for Paasi the 'areal extent' of a region is not confined to any specific 'natural' spatial level or scale. Rather, a region can refer to a neighbourhood, a city, a municipality, a county, or a nation-state (Paasi <i>et al.</i>, 1994; Paasi, 1986). In other words, 'region' is introduced conceptually, as an abstraction, and cannot be reduced to either: (1) a given administrative unit; (2) a particular scale without considering wider geospatial connections; or (3) the concrete or empirical (Paasi, 1991: 243; see also Gilbert, 1988; Sayer, 1989; Cox and Mair, 1989).</p> <p>According to Paasi, a region represents the condensation of a complex history of economic, political, and social processes into a specific <i>cultural image</i>. A region thus crystallizes as an institutional construction which both reflects the collective history of an area and infuses the everyday lives of its inhabitants (Murphy, 1991). Central to Paasi's analysis is the <i>institutionalization</i> of regions, defined as:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">A socio-spatial process during which some territorial unit emerges as a part of the spatial structure of a society and becomes established and clearly identified in different spheres of social action and social consciousness (Paasi, 1986: 121).</p> <p>This process itself comprises four stages (Paasi, 1986: 119-30; 1991: 243-7; 1996: 31-38). It must be emphasized however that these four 'stages' do not occur in some neat chronological fashion. Rather they are best understood as inter-dependent and mutually constituting processes, only distinguishable from each other analytically (Paasi, 1996), and subject to change contingent upon the balance of economic, social and political forces. The first 'stage' in the institutionalization process is the <i>development of territorial shape</i>. This encompasses the localization of social practices (economy, politics, and administration) and the 'reach of power relations' (Reynolds, 1994) through which regional transformation takes place, before coming to be identified as a distinct (bounded) unit in the spatial structure. The capacity to influence the production of space alongside the materialization of power relationships inscribed in political, administrative, economic and symbolic practices play a vital role in the emergence of territorial shape and boundaries, which themselves can vary greatly. Paasi also makes the point that the boundaries of nation-states tend to be more 'strictly defined, symbolized and sanctioned', whilst for smaller localities and sub-national 'regions' the boundaries can be more diffuse, less influential and symbolically vibrant (Paasi, 1996). Moreover, as we will see below, for a 'stateless nation' like Scotland or Wales, the cultural or political boundaries and 'critical definers' become even more complex and multi-faceted (Hague, 1996). Secondly, we have the <i>formation of the conceptual or symbolic shape</i>, whereupon certain territorial symbols will become established and 'creatively implicated in the constitution of [a territory's] social relations' (Paasi, 1996: 29). For Paasi:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Territorial symbols are often abstract expressions of supposed group solidarity, embodying the actions of political, economic, administrative and cultural institutions in the continual reproduction and legitimation of the system of practices that constitute and demarcate the territorial unit concerned. Thus symbols are instrumental in the sense that they serve to evoke powerful emotions of identification with territorial groupings and can generate action. Symbols are 'keywords' in the dominating story of a territorially based community (Paasi, 1996: 34).</p> <p>Of particular significance in the region's 'identity matrix' is its very <i>naming</i>. It is the name of a region which connects its image with the regional consciousness of both the inhabitants and 'outsiders' (cf. Jenson, 1993). In this sense, the 'story' (or narrative [Somers, 1994]) of a territory like Italy or Scotland becomes a means of creating a consciousness of 'being' Italian or Scottish (Smart, 1983; in Paasi, 1996: 55). Paasi's third stage concerns the <i>emergence of institutions</i>. This involves the establishment of more formal vehicles such as education, law, and the media, alongside local or regional practices in politics, economics, administration and culture. As well as helping to reinforce 'naming', this process fosters additional symbolism in and through the emergence of a plethora of organizations and institutions, all of which provide an 'effective means of reproducing the material and mental existence of the territories' in question (Paasi, 1991: 246).</p> <p>At this stage, and drawing on the social theories of Habermas (1984) and Giddens (1990), Paasi claims that as the division of labour becomes ever more complex, societal processes are increasingly organized in and through institutional forms situated beyond the level of local communities. In effect, (and this</p>

resonates with Giddens' notions of 'stretching'; and time-space distanciation), the spatial 'reality' surrounding individuals becomes more extensive; being increasingly 'situated' within the state machinery and associated expert systems, alongside the mass media, newspapers and other national and global systems of communication. Moreover, in the re-production of this sociospatial consciousness, key 'activists' – journalists, teachers in schools and higher education ⁴, politicians, civil servants and business leaders – act as something akin to organic intellectuals (cf. Gramsci, 1971) and/or 'interpretive communities' (Reynolds, 1994). In other words, they help to actively shape the hegemonic regional consciousness, whilst at the same time reproducing the very power assigned to such institutional and civic roles (Paasi, 1991, 1996). Indeed for Paasi, it is the institutions of a territory which eventually become the most important factors in the macro-reproduction of the region and regional consciousness (Paasi, 1986).

Finally, there is the *establishment* of a region in the spatial structure and social consciousness of society. At this stage, the 'territorial unit' is ready to be discursively and materially constituted for all manner of means, such as place marketing or as a weapon in an ideological struggle over resources and power, in, for example, regional policy. Furthermore, if the region has gained administrative status, it can act relationally with national and supra-national state levels. In other words, on its establishment, a region is not only a region in itself; it has become a 'localized [or regionalized] social structure' (Cox and Mair, 1991), capable of acting for itself ⁵, if not necessarily in conditions of its own choosing. A key implication of Paasi's framework is that the study of *boundaries* in political geographical analysis needs to transcend notions of static 'territorial lines' so as to become more contextual. In particular, researchers should become more considerate of the various sociospatial practices and forms of consciousness which actively constitute the process of building regions, nations and states and their (inconstant) territorial demarcations (Paasi, 1996: 23-31). Agnew makes a related claim that the ontology of local-to-national flow that has predominated within much geopolitical discourse 'ought to be replaced by a geographical imagination that situates the negotiation of identities within a wider set of local-global linkages' (Agnew, 1996: 34). A further point to contemplate here is that, rather than being somehow 'pre-given', geographical scale itself represents the (reified) crystallization of contested processes of political struggle, narrative identity, power, inclusion and exclusion (see Smith, 1993).

Table 2E-3 (Continued)

Literature Source	Selected Extracts
Rosenau, J. N. (1998), 'Governance and Democracy in a Globalizing World', in Archibugi, D., Held, D. and Kohler, M. (eds), <i>Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy</i> , Stanford University Press.	<p>Rosenau (1998: 29):</p> <p>The United Nations system and national governments are surely central to the conduct of global governance, but they are only part of the full picture. Consequently, in the ensuing analysis global governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from the family to the international organization – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions. ... it seems a mistake to adhere to a narrow definition in which only formal institutions at the national and international levels are considered relevant. In the words of the Council of Rome,</p>
	<p style="padding-left: 40px;">We use the term governance to denote the <i>command</i> mechanism of a social system and its actions that endeavour to provide security, prosperity, coherence, order and continuity to the system ... Taken broadly, the concept of governance should not be restricted to the national and international systems but should be used in relation to regional, provincial and local governments as well as to other social systems such as education and the military, to private enterprises and even to the microcosm of the family [King and Schneider 1991: 181-2 (emphasis added); see also Friedmann 1992; Huckfeldt, Plutzer and Sprague 1993: 365-81].</p>
	<p>Rosenau (1998: 34):</p> <p style="text-align: center;">THE RELOCATION OF AUTHORITY</p>
	<p>Notwithstanding the evolutionary dynamics of control mechanisms and the absence of an overall structural order, it is possible to identify pockets of coherence operating at different levels and in different parts of the world that can serve as bases for assessing the contours of global governance in the future. It may be the case that 'processes of governance at the global level are inherently more fragile, contingent and unevenly experienced than is the case within most national political systems,' [McGrew 1992: 318] but this is not to deny the presence of central tendencies. One such tendency involves an 'upsurge in the collective capacity to govern': despite the rapid pace of ever greater complexity and decentralization – and to some extent because of their exponential dynamics – the world is undergoing 'a remarkable expansion of collective power', an expansion that is highly disaggregated and unfolds unevenly but that nevertheless amounts to a development of rule systems 'that have become (1) more intensive in their permeation of daily life, (2) more permanent over time, (3) more extensive over space, (4) larger in size, (5) wider in functional scope, (6) more constitutionally differentiated, and (7) more bureaucratic' [Hewson 1994: 2]. Global governance in the coming decades may not take the form of a single world order, but it will not be lacking in activities designed to bring a measure of coherence to the multitude of jurisdictions that are proliferating on the world stage.</p>
	<p>Perhaps even more important, a pervasive tendency can be identified in which major shifts in the location of authority and the site of control mechanisms are underway on every continent and in every country, shifts that are as pronounced in economic and social systems as they are in political systems. Indeed, in some cases the shifts have transferred authority away from the political realm and into the economic and social realms as in still other instances the shift occurs in the opposite direction.</p>
<p>Rosenau (1998: 35):</p> <p>In short, the numerous shifts in the loci of governance stem from interactive tensions whereby processes of globalization and localization are simultaneously unfolding on a worldwide scale. In some situations the foregoing dynamics are fostering control mechanisms that extend beyond national boundaries and in others the need for the psychic comfort of neighbourhood or ethnic attachments is leading to the diminution of national entities and the formation or extension of local mechanisms. The combined effect of the simultaneity of these contradictory trends is that of lessening the capacities for governance located at the level of sovereign states and national societies [see Rosenau 1997: 57-80]. Much governance will doubtless continue to be sustained by states and their governments initiating and implementing policies in the context of their legal frameworks – and in some instances national governments are likely to work out arrangements for joint governance with rule systems at other levels – but the effectiveness of their policies is likely to be undermined by the proliferation of emergent control mechanisms both within and outside their jurisdiction. ... None of this is to imply, of course, that the shifts in the loci of authority occurs easily, with a minimum of commotion and a maximum of clarity. Far from it: the shifts derive from delicate bargaining, and usually they must overcome extensive opposition. As a result:</p>	
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">Transfer of authority is a complicated process and it seems there no longer is one single identifiable sovereign, but a multitude of authorities at different levels of aggregation and several centres with differing degrees of coercive power (not all of them public and governmental!) ... it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate between public and private institutions, the State and Civil Society, domestic and international [Lahteenmaki and Kakonen 1994: 32-3].</p>	
<p>In the words of one analyst, 'the very high levels of interdependence and vulnerability stimulated by technological change now necessitate new forms of global political authority and even governance' [Vogler 1992: 118].</p>	

Table 2E-3 (Continued)

Literature Source	Selected Extracts
<p>Harvey, D. (2000), <i>Spaces of Hope</i>, University of California Press, Berkeley.</p>	<p>Harvey (2000: 75-77):</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>The production of spatial scales</i></p> <p>Human beings have typically produced a nested hierarchy of spatial scales within which to organize their activities and understand their world. Households, communities, and nations are obvious examples of contemporary organizational forms that exist at different scales. We immediately intuit in today's world that matters look differently when analyzed at global, continental, national, regional, local, or household/personal scales. What appears significant or makes sense at one scale cannot be understood outside of the nested relationships that exist across a hierarchy of scales – personal behaviours (e.g. driving cars) produce (when aggregated) local and regional effects that culminate incontinent-wide problems of, say, acid deposition or global warming. Such an intuitive breakdown is inadequate, however, because it makes it appear as if the scales are immutable or even wholly natural, rather than systemic products of changing technologies, modes of human organization and political struggle.</p> <p>This does not mean that the relevant scales are defined outside of so-called 'natural' components or influences. Ecological processes and the multiple physical processes that regulate the conditions of lands, waters, and atmosphere themselves operate at a variety of scales (and are usually so represented in the physical and ecological sciences). The definition of where an 'ecosystem' might begin and end and what kind of 'entity' it might be at what kind of scale (a pond or a continent?) is fundamental to the question of how to formulate an ecologically sensitive politics. It is, therefore, through a dynamic interaction with what might be called 'natural process' scalars that human beings produce and instantiate their own scales for pursuing their own goals and organizing their collective behaviours.</p> <p>... The case of changing territorialization clearly shows that there is nothing 'natural' about political boundaries even if natural features have often played some kind of role in their definition. Territorialization is, in the end, an outcome of political struggles and decisions made in a context of technological and political-economic conditions. The formation of the European Union (a long process that began with the Monet plan of 1948) is a long case history of a process of transformation of territoriality from one scale to another. But changes of this scale have implications elsewhere. There is, for example, a contemporary debate in France as to how local governments should be construed (both in territorial organization and powers). A political cleavage exists between a conception that runs 'localities, departments, nation state' (with all of its strong traditional appeals) versus 'collectivities, regions, Europe' (which reflects the new realities being forged at the level of the European Union). The outcome of this political struggle will have important implications for how people can organize their communal life. In fact the changing powers of local and metropolitan governments in relationship to nation states and global forces (I think of everything from inter-urban competition for multinational investment and 'urban entrepreneurship' to the Agenda 21 element of Rio agreements which mandated a whole series of local government actions to contain global warming) has been one significant way in which a particular scale of human organization has enhanced its role in the last twenty years (see, e.g., Borja and Castells, 1997).</p> <p>The scales at which human activity can be orchestrated depend heavily, of course, on technological innovations (the transport and communications system being vital) as well as upon changing political economic conditions (trade, geopolitical rivalries, alliances, etc.). They are also outcomes of class and other forms of political/social struggle at the same time as they define the scales at which class struggle must be fought (see Herod, 1998). As Swyngedouw (1997, 141) argues:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Spatial scales are never fixed, but are perpetually redefined, contested, and restructured in terms of their extent, content, relative importance, and interrelations. ... relative social power positions will vary considerably depending on who controls what at which scale. [see full quote above]</p> <p>When, to take another example, city governments assumed too much oppositional power in relation to capital accumulation in the Progressive era in the United States, then the bourgeoisie moved to a different scale and called for the centralization of powers within the Federal government which it was in a better position to control (Margaret Thatcher disbanded the Marxist-led Greater London Council and reorganized local government for exactly the same reason). The relocation of legal powers to international organizations like the world Trade Organization with its far more insidious counterpart of the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment, as well as the formation of larger-scale entities like the European Union and NAFTA, have likewise been politically led by capitalist class interests. Oppositional forces often push in the other direction. Secessionist movements and demands for local autonomy (such as those voiced by the Zapatistas) spring up to protect, for example, ethnic minorities, achieved standards of living and welfare protections, or environmental values (where the slogan 'small is beautiful' has considerable purchase). ... The scale at which a city/place like Baltimore gets defined ... makes it a quite different entity today than was the case 200 years ago. The implications for politics and economy, for sociality and for the meaning that can possibly be put upon the idea of the city (recalling Plato's view that the ideal republican city should have no more than 5,000 people) are legion.</p> <p>From all these standpoints, therefore, we can meaningfully talk of 'the production of scale' in human affairs ... Plainly, the hierarchical scales at which human activities are now being organized are different from, say, thirty years ago. 'Globalization' in part signifies an important aspect of that shift.</p>

Table 2E-3 (Continued)

Literature Source	Selected Extracts
<p>Marston, S. (2000). 'The Social construction of scale', <i>Progress in Human Geography</i>, Vol. 24, No. 2, June 2000, 219-242.</p>	<p>Marston (2000: 219):</p> <p>In this article I review the important literature on scale construction and argue for enlarging our scope for understanding scale to include the complex processes of social reproduction and consumption. I base my critique on a short case study which illustrates that attention to other processes besides production and other systems of domination besides capitalism can enhance our theorizing and improve our attempts to effect real social change.</p> <p>Marston (2000: 235):</p> <p>A discourse about women as 'female citizens' operated among and between scales from the household out to the globe and provided these subjects with a consciousness that enabled a particular negotiation of patriarchal subordination and began a gender transformation of the public sphere through a reconstitution of the private sphere of the home. In short, the home was utilized as a scale of social and political identity formation that eventually enabled American middle-class urban women to extend their influence beyond the home to other scales of social life, enabling them to influence issues of production, social reproduction and consumption in the process.</p> <p>Marston (2000: 238):</p> <p>Erik Swyngedouw (1997: 169) writes:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Geographical configurations as a set of interacting and nested scales (the 'gestalt of scale') become produced as temporary stand-offs in a perpetual transformative, and on occasion transgressive, social-spatial power struggle. These struggles change the importance and role of certain geographical scales, reassert the importance of others, and sometimes create entirely new significant scales, but – most importantly – these scale redefinitions alter and express changes in the geometry of social power by strengthening power and control by some while disempowering others.</p>
<p>Brenner, N. (2001). 'The limits to scale? Methodological reflections on scalar structuration', <i>Progress in Human Geography</i>, Vol. 25, No. 4, December 2001, pp. 591-614.</p>	<p>Brenner (2001: 604):</p> <p>I shall conclude this discussion by proposing eleven methodological hypotheses that might serve as general starting-points for the investigation of processes of scalar structuration. ... Although the hypotheses are presented here in eleven distinct steps, they articulate mutually reinforcing rather than merely additive methodological assumptions.</p> <p>Brenner (2001: 607-8):</p> <p>[Hypothesis 11]</p> <p>Processes of scalar structuration constitute geographies and choreographies of social power. The structuration of social processes by scale mediates, and is in turn mediated by, highly asymmetrical and thus conflict-laden social power relations (Berndt, 2000; Castree, 2000; Herod, 1997; Leitner, 1997; Swyngedouw, 1997; Smith, 1993). On the one hand, the establishment and reorganization of scalar hierarchies creates geographies and choreographies of inclusion/exclusion and domination/subordination which empower some actors, alliances and organizations at the expense of others, according to criteria such as class, gender, race/ethnicity and nationality. On the other hand, such scalar hierarchies may operate not merely as arenas of social power struggles but also as their very objects insofar as they are challenged and unsettled in the course of sociopolitical struggles and conflicts. In this sense, as Swyngedouw (1997: 141) has suggested, 'the continuous reshuffling and reorganization of spatial scales is an integral part of social strategies and struggles for control and empowerment.' Concomitantly, in Smith's (1993: 101) concise formulation, 'The scale of struggle and the struggle over scale are two sides of the same coin.' The specification of the particular historical-geographical conditions under which scalar hierarchies may become stakes rather than mere settings of social struggle is a theoretical and empirical task that awaits more systematic investigation. In an epoch in which new, highly disempowering and increasingly authoritarian scalar arrangements are being forged and aggressively entrenched by the agents of transnational capital and US-dominated global neoliberalism, an analysis of this issue would appear to be one of the more urgently important political contributions that could be made by progressive theorists and analysts of rescaling processes (Swyngedouw, 2000).</p>
<p>Marston, S.A. and Smith, N. A. (2001). 'States, scales and households: limits to scale thinking? A response to Brenner', <i>Progress in Human Geography</i>, Vol. 25, No. 4, December 2001, pp. 615-619.</p>	<p>Marston and Smith (2001: 618):</p> <p>It is simply arbitrary that the home is relegated to a 'place' or 'arena', while the state gets to be a multifaceted 'scale'. [Throughout Brenner's past work on scale there has been a periodic conflation of the national scale with the state. In the response to the original paper there is a clear recognition that the modern state is multiply scaled at national, local and regional levels. The consistent omission of the global scale of state formation is interesting especially since, of course, it was the 'globalization of the state' that provoked Lefebvre's methodological comments on scale in the first place.] His [Brenner's] contention that households comprise 'relatively stable background structures to many of the sociospatial transformations in question' speaks volumes. One can imagine the response if the original article had dismissed states as 'relatively stable background structures'.</p>

Table 2E-3 (Continued)

Literature Source	Selected Extracts
<p>Howitt, R. (2003), 'Scale', in Agnew, J., Mitchell, K. and Toal, G. (eds), <i>A Companion to Political Geography</i>. Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 138-157.</p>	<p>Howitt (2003: 138):</p> <p>There is a wide consensus among human geographers that the social construction of scale affects cultural and political landscapes. This is particularly obvious in debates about both globalization and localism. Within economic geography, the dominance of a production-centred discourse has often reduced "politics" to consideration of the ways in which states and corporations have constructed scales for their economic or strategic benefit – at the expense of workers or others.</p>
	<p>Howitt (2003: 139-140):</p> <p>The Idea of Scale</p> <p>Within human geography, there has been a robust discussion of the concept of scale in recent years. Two figures dominated discussion of scale in the 1980s: Peter J Taylor (e.g. 1982, 1987, 1988, 1993, 1994, 1999, 2000a, 2000b) and Neil Smith (e.g. 1984, 1988, 1992, 1993; Smith and Ward, 1987). ... Drawing on Wallerstein's world systems theory, Taylor advocated a three level model of scale in geopolitics. He identifies "world-economy", "nation-state" and "locality" as the three critical scales at which the processes of the world economy are manifest (e.g. 1993, pp. 43-48). Smith, who maintains Taylor's notion of a hierarchy of scales, highlights urban, regional, national and global as the critical scale categories in his analyses.</p> <p>...</p> <p>Howitt (1993a) rejected the idea that scale categories are ontological givens, and questioned the previously unquestioned assumption that scale was necessarily a matter of nested hierarchies.</p>
	<p>Howitt (2003: 140):</p> <p>In 1997, the journal <i>Political Geography</i> ran a special issue under the title "Political Geography of Scale" (Delaney and Leitner, 1997a). Guest editors Delaney and Leitner suggested "scale is a familiar and taken-for-granted concept for political geographers and political analysts" (Delaney and Leitner, 1997b, p. 93). They opened with a confident definition of scale as "the nested hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing size, such as the local, regional, national and global" (p. 93) and asserted that scales are periodically transformed and constructed. The four papers in this special issue advocated a "constructivist" approach to scale and taken together they provide a powerful opening in what the editors saw as "a theoretical project that necessarily involves attention to the relationships between space and power" (p. 96).</p>
	<p>Howitt (2003: 141):</p> <p>Judd (1998) responds by reminding us that the power relations that are constructed by the state's construction of scales in material forms through jurisdictional, administrative and regulatory structures, restricts the flexibility of resistance considerably more than Cox allows.</p> <p>...</p> <p>In the same journal [Political Geography], Morrill considered how different jurisdictional scales are harnessed by powerful vested interests to their own purposes. In particular, Morrill was concerned to address the question of "whether there is an optimum or appropriate level of decision-making or balance of power across geographical scales" (1999a, p. 1).</p>
	<p>Howitt (2003: 142-143):</p> <p>... Leitner adopts a "constructionist perspective" on scale, understood as a "nested hierarchy of political spaces" (1997, p. 125) to consider the institutional context of migration in Europe.</p>
	<p>Howitt (2003: 143):</p> <p>Herod's analysis provides a powerful demonstration of how it is particular relationships, developed in specific institutional, technological, political and economic contexts that constitute the scales which themselves become institutionalized as self-evident and embedded in real-world economic geographies. Rather than organized labor, Agnew focuses on political parties and how they are implicated in "writing the scripts of geographical scale" (1997, p. 101), emphasizing the role of political parties in linking individuals to collective action by articulating goals around which people can be mobilized. The institutional organization of electoral processes link parties, policies, and populations to particular places in particular ways, and bring them together in organized political relationships. Their mediation and utilization of the politics of difference, identity and territoriality contribute to the constitution of the state – whether this is in terms of local, regional, national or supra-state governance. The collapse of old-style parties and the emergence of new style parties in 1994 defined new scale relationships, even if they fitted within the old spatial boundaries of the nation.</p>
	<p>Howitt (2003: 143):</p> <p>Although less cited that work from North America and Europe, Fagan (eg 1995, 1997, Sadler and Fagan 2000), Howitt (e.g. 1993a, 1998a), McGuirk (1997) and others have forged an Australian perspective on scale issues which advocates a radically relational approach. Howitt's (1993a) critique of the dominant</p>

thinking about scale suggested that the idea of scale as a set of nested hierarchies was totally inadequate for understanding scale politics, and that the widespread conflation of scaled ideas had produced conceptual confusion in many presentations. He advocated an empirically grounded dialectical approach to investigation of scale issues. Fagan (1995) offered a powerful critique of the difficulty geographers were having in handling the idea of globalization and its implications for action, resistance and responses at other scales – and geographers' analysis of and contributions to them. He pointed out that the very processes that were being rhetorically constructed as fundamental to an irresistible globalization "can be constructed as *local*" (1995, p. 7, his emphasis). His careful examination of 'the region as political discourse' provided a scaled analysis of political economic changes in Australia and the Asia-Pacific region that considered the nature of power relations within and across scales as critical to political process and real-world geographies.

Howitt (2003: 144):

In advocating a view of scale as having (at least) three dimensions – size, level and relation – Howitt (1998a) re-emphasized the importance of social relationships in space as fundamental in constructing geographical scales. Following Howitt, and Swyngedouw (1997a), Marston (2000) offers an expanded concept of scale that encompasses the domains of reproduction and consumption as well as production, as a synthesis of the recent debates.

...

[Marston (2000)] suggests that we can see these processes producing new scales such as "home" and "neighborhood" in ways that echo loudly not just in the political geographies of the US in the early twentieth century, but throughout the contemporary world.

Howitt (2003: 145-146):

Building on this image, it has been easy to privilege one scale or another as the pre-eminent platform for political action. International relations, for example, posits the nation state and its interaction with other nation states as preeminent, as did conventional geopolitics. World-systems theory posits the global sphere as the most significant scale (Taylor, 1988, 1993, 2000). Locality studies have privileged the local as the scale at which meaning or lived-experience is constructed. The paradoxical positions taken on local, national and global scales was a starting point for much of the critical discourse on scale referred to above.

In contradiction of the neat schemas of scale as a nested hierarchy, neither geopolitics nor social justice are reducible to a single dimension – in space, in time, or in cultural relations. Peoples' struggles for justice, their efforts to construct new geographies of justice, are always multifaceted. They always reflect (at least) economic, cultural and environmental politics.

...

No simple schema that privileges a singular scale as the essential scale at which justice can be achieved is reasonable. And no schema that excludes the scale politics of place, territory, and power will adequately address the nature of geopolitics or the struggle for social and environmental justice. Again, these concerns return us to the issue of the social construction of scale. Harvey tackles this issue, and follows N. Smith in conceptualizing social processes operating in a way that produces "a nested hierarchy of scales (from global to local) leaving us always with the political-ecological question of how to 'arbitrate and translate between them'" (1996, pp. 203-4, quoting N. Smith, 1992, p. 72). Harvey usefully goes on to discuss the ways in which social conceptions of space and time are constructed in social processes and simultaneously become objectified as pervasive "facts of nature" (1996, p. 211) that regulate social practices. Yet neither Smith nor Harvey is clear why the social construction of scale produces a nested hierarchy of scales. Howitt (1993a) argued against the notion of both nesting and hierarchy as adequate metaphors for geographical scale, suggesting that it was in cross-scale linkages, awkward juxtapositions and jumps, and non-hierarchical dialectics that the nature and significance of scale is to be found. Swyngedouw (1997a, b) follows a similar approach, but retains a notion of "nesting" while rejecting some aspects of "hierarchy."

Howitt (2003: 147):

Jhappan (1992) offers another example, this time at the level of international relations, of the ways in which the indigenous peoples movement has succeeded in upsetting such taken-for-granted nested hierarchies of control, exclusion and marginalization, and in the process, have challenged the dominant view of scale as an areal concept (scale as size) or a hierarchical concept (scale as level).

Howitt (2003: 148):

MacLeod and Goodwin suggest that many of the institutional responses to globalization, regional restructuring and localism in Europe, have failed to problematize scale and consequently "appear to treat as ontologically 'pre-given' the scalar context" of their work (1999, p. 711). [A related question is raised by Wilson et al (1999) in their consideration of "scale misperceptions" in the management of social-ecological systems. The imposition of conservation area and other jurisdictional boundaries on the development of ecological relations such as non-human populations, clearly affects management options. This common mismatch has increased the pressure for bioregional planning as a way of matching ecological and administrative boundaries (see, e.g., Brunckhurst, 2000)].

Howitt (2003: 148-149):

Despite this, indigenous politics provides many examples of the harnessing of scale analysis to the purposes of social transformation – to simultaneously pursue the economic politics of redistribution, the cultural politics of recognition and the environmental politics of sustainability. In my own experience, the issue of just what scale is has been greatly clarified in my work alongside indigenous colleagues in actually re-building the scales of family, clan, language group, tribe and peoples in the wake of Australia's unacknowledged genocide (Tatz, 1999; see also Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission, 1997). In Australia, Aboriginal groups have long struggled to overcome the legacies of the colonial and post-colonial fragmentation of their traditional domains. This has never been just a matter of jurisdictional recognition of property rights. Official indifference to more radical aspects of a reconciliation agenda – including a naïve and self-interested assertion that negotiating treaties in Australia would divide national sovereignty – have left little room for political maneuver. [Australia is a federal state, with national sovereignty already divided between six colonial states, each of which retains a direct link to the Queen of the Australian Commonwealth, who is, of course, also the Head of State of the United Kingdom. This division of sovereignty never troubles conservative and racist criticism of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander efforts to reassert their own sovereignty. Indeed, a recent referendum on a shift from monarchy to republic status for the Commonwealth was rejected. These issues are taken up in more detail in Howitt 1998b.] Yet it is in the scale politics of identity, difference, territory, and governance that opportunities can be found.

In re-building indigenous governance, the process of social construction of geographical scales is laid bare. To construct the means of new forms of social, economic or political participation, the networks and relationships that bring people together must undergo transformation through their confrontation with, marginalization from and interpenetration by the institutions, relations and processes of existing complexes of territory-governance-identity. In Quebec, for example, the 1975 negotiation of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement provided for new institutional arrangements for local governance and participation among the Cree and Inuit peoples. In 1971 these communities were brought together for the first time ...

Howitt (2003: 149, 152):

This scale of tribal governance is clearly *not* an ontological given. It never appears in the standard scale lists of "local", "national," and "global". [... in one of the key early texts that raises issues of scale, N. Smith makes First Nations completely invisible ...] It does not even appear in those extended lists that include the scale of "the body", "home," and "infinity" (see Howitt, 2002).

Howitt (2003: 150-151):

The challenge of scale in contemporary political geography is that it presents a paradox. On the one hand it seems self evident. Scale is a term that easily slips into our discussion because the scaled processes of "globalization", "national sovereignty" and "local action" that are the taken-for-granted focus of so much political geography are so obvious. Similarly, it is equally obvious that scales are socially and politically constructed. Yet, when one tries to offer a definition of just what is being constructed, most attempts are unsatisfactory. In the 4th edition of the *Dictionary of Human Geography*, N Smith (2000, p. 727) takes 2½ pages to arrive at the statement that the "question of scale will become one of mounting theoretical and practical relevance," but does not provide a definition. The nature of scale, then, is paradoxical. But the recent literature on scale has rendered the reason for this much clearer. For a long time, it was assumed that scale was a question of either size or level (e.g. of complexity). What emerges from the recent literature is that scale is preeminently a matter of relation, and that approaches which seek to summarize this dimension with the gloss of labels such as "global" or "local" without engaging with what is actually encompassed in context by the term, will actually miss the substance of the term and the phenomenon it represents. Like another quintessentially geographical term "place", "scale" is rendered most meaningful in its development as an empirical generalization – a concept made real by building up an understanding of complex and dynamic relationships and processes in context. As an theoretical abstraction the risk is that "scale" is reduced to a set of meaningless labels that say something about size and complexity, but which hide precisely the terrain with which critical geopolitics is most interested – the terrain of real landscapes in which spaces of engagement offer a myriad of transformational opportunities at a myriad of scales.

Table 2E-3 (Continued)

Source	Selected Extracts
Keniry, J., Blums, A., Notter, E., Radford, E. and Thomson, S. (2003), <i>Regional Business: A Plan for Action</i> , Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional Services, Canberra.	Keniry et al. (2003: 2):
	<p>Many of our Actions require planning and action to occur at a broader level than that of local government. By this we are talking about regions self-identifying themselves with what we are calling their 'regional footprint'. Such regions will be of the right size to reflect their common interests and similar competitive advantages. These 'regional footprints' will transcend current artificial boundaries and form the most logical and appropriate geographic area for economic planning and development.</p>
	Keniry et al. (2003: 5):
	<p>Australia's federated system of government, created in the 19th century, no longer meets 21st century imperatives of globalisation. Each region is an important national economic unit, yet there is no national approach to planning and development at the regional level. Local governments are generally too small, state governments too large. The result is poor regional planning, inadequate coordination between the three levels of government, duplication and wastage. Distance from services and isolation, apparent or real, add to the impact of these factors on regional business. All this affects regional business confidence and, without confidence, business cannot grow on a sustainable basis.</p>
	Keniry et al. (2003: 17-18):
	<p>The impact of globalisation on regions is two-fold. Firstly, most research indicates that regional economies are inextricably linked to metropolitan economies. For example, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD 2001: 27] has noted:</p>
	<p style="padding-left: 40px;">'The key implication... is that the future of regional and city economies is closely related to their emerging role in international and no longer just national contexts.'</p>
	<p>A region, well defined by its competitive advantage based on the right 'regional footprint', is probably the most important economic unit in terms of national economic growth. The current theories on globalisation indicate regional businesses are <i>more</i>, not less, important to the national economic good [Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics 2003: 73].</p>
	<p>... Australia's federated system of government, developed in the late 19th century for the challenges of the 20th century, does not cope well with 21st century reality. Local governments are generally too small and state governments are too large to provide the systems of governance and certainty required by regional business. Regional structures based on the right-sized regional footprint are required—central governments must become partners within these structures, rather than their controllers, for regional economic development to occur [OECD 2001: 247].</p>
	Keniry et al. (2003: 28):
The three tiers of government	
<p>The size of local governments compounds the problems. Of the 720 local government bodies across Australia, around 580 are classified as regional [National Office of Local Government 2003: 2]. This is 80 per cent of councils representing around one-third of the population. More than 50 per cent of local government bodies have a population base of fewer than 6 500 people. In Queensland and South Australia, the median population base is even less (3 189 and 2 727 respectively) with the smallest areas having populations of no more than 200 people [National Office of Local Government 2003: 4]. As a result, many local governments are carrying enormous overhead structures. The high costs of administration mean that governments are subsidising these inefficient structures and resources are unavailable for planning and other essential services. If councils were businesses, many small ones would be insolvent. Exacerbating the problems of size is the fact that many local governments have a fairly parochial outlook, which means they tend to compete with each other rather than cooperate from a regional perspective [Jones 2003].</p>	
<p>Commonwealth and state and territory governments should play an important role in regional economic planning and development. State and territory governments, however, are too large to provide effective regional planning and the Commonwealth is often too remote from the needs of individual regions.</p>	
<p>The focus of activity across the three layers of government often overlaps causing duplication and inefficient use of tax payers' funds.</p>	
Economic/regional development bodies	
<p>The effectiveness of regional bodies established by Commonwealth, state and territory governments is often affected by the level of competition between different layers of government, the level of coordination of development plans for the region and the level of coordination of programmes and initiatives [Beer and Maude 2002: 54-55]. Often there are simply too many bodies trying to achieve common outcomes for the same area. As a result, public funding is spread too thinly and resource starved organisations spend considerable time chasing additional funding. [Beer and Maude 2002: 57]. Because there are so many agencies trying to deliver services, few have the resources to go outside their immediate area. This means that businesses outside these centres have little support.</p>	

Table 2E-3 (Continued)

Literature Source	Selected Extracts
<p>McMaster, R. B. and Sheppard, E. (2004), 'Introduction: Scale and Geographic Inquiry', in Sheppard, E. & McMaster, R. B. (Eds.), <i>Scale and Geographic Inquiry: Nature, Society, and Method</i> (pp. 1-22), Blackwell, Oxford.</p>	<p>McMaster and Sheppard (2004: 4-5):</p> <p>The scales used by human geographers range from the human body to the globe:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • human body; • household; • neighborhood; • city; • metropolitan area; • province/state; • continent; • globe (all adjectives, or all verbs). <p>These scales have generally been thought of as nested, although the true relationships among scales are often more complicated than this. For example, the Twin Cities metropolitan area is not nested within the state of minnesota, but stretches into Wisconsin.</p> <p>A related range of spatial scales, designed for environmental health policy and research, was proposed by Sexton et al. (2002). This includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • personal exposure; • city block / factory; • city; • state; • country / continent; • earth.
<p>Swyngedouw, E. (2004), 'Scaled Geographies: Nature, Place, and the Politics of Scale', in Sheppard, E. & McMaster, R. B. (Eds.), <i>Scale and Geographic Inquiry: Nature, Society, and Method</i> (pp. 129-153), Blackwell, Oxford.</p>	<p>Swyngedouw (2004: 143-145):</p> <p>As T. Smith (1969: 20) argues, ... "the identity of the drainage basin seemed to offer a concrete and "natural" unit which could profitably replace political units as the areal context for geographical study." Brunhes (1920: 93) insisted on the water basin as the foundation for the organization of the land since "water is the sovereign wealth of the state and its people" (see also Chorley, 1969). Such a view was widely recounted in Spain at the time, and its arguments were rallied in defence of a new orographic-administrative organization of the territory.</p> <p>The "scientific" and "natural" division, based on the spatial scale of the river basin, provided an apparently enduring and universal scale for territorial organization in lieu of the historically more recent and "constructed" political scales associated with politico-administrative boundaries. ... The attempt to "naturalize" political territorial organization was part and parcel of a strategy of the modernizers to challenge existing social and political power geometries. ...</p> <p>River basins became the scale par excellence through which the modernizers tried to erode the powers of the more traditional provincial or national state bodies, while traditional elites held to the existing administrative territorial structure of power.</p>
<p>Marston, S. (2004), 'A Long Way from Home: Domesticating the Social Production of Scale', in Sheppard, E. & McMaster, R. B. (Eds.), <i>Scale and Geographic Inquiry: Nature, Society, and Method</i> (pp. 170-191), Blackwell, Oxford.</p>	<p>Marston (2004: 172):</p> <p>Although human geographers have been interested in scale for over two decades (Taylor, 1982; Kirby, 1985; Holly, 1978), the novelty in recent thinking is the commitment to recognizing that scale is made, and not an ontologically given category; that scale is not a preordained hierarchical nomenclature for ordering the world, but rather a contingent outcome of the tensions between structural forces and the intervention of human agents. This apparently simple point is critical because recognizing that scale is not infinitely fixed forces us to understand and theorize the process whereby it is made, reorganized and transformed (Swyngedouw, 1997).</p>

Table 2E-3 (Continued)

Literature Source	Selected Extracts
<p>Smith, N. (2004), 'Scale Bending and the Fate of the National', in Sheppard, E. & McMaster, R. B. (Eds.), <i>Scale and Geographic Inquiry: Nature, Society, and Method</i> (pp. 192-212), Blackwell, Oxford.</p>	<p>Smith (2004: 206):</p> <p>Nation-states initially crystallized amidst the combined, if contrary, processes of global economic expansion and the centralization of capital, and the new phase of globalization also involves a centralization of capital at different scales. The scale of the nation-state is not automatically weakened but could conceivably be strengthened in certain places as an integral outcome of economic globalization. ...</p> <p>With appropriate state institutions, therefore, the new globalism can easily generate a new nationalism, but it is equally matched by restructuring of the urban and regional scales, as well as others (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999); Paasi, 1991; Ohmae, 1995; Scott, 1998; Brenner, 2000; Smith, N., 2000). It is not so much that a "state scale" nestles between global and urban scales (Brenner, 1997: 154-8), but that a thoroughgoing rescaling of the state is occurring as part of this complex set of territorial and political shifts. ... it seems to me that the restructuring of scale today, and the rescaling of the state that is integral to but only a part of this process, not only takes place across and throughout the scale hierarchy, from the body to the global, but is fundamentally a process of struggle. Struggles over the rescaling of the state may be very different in different places, at different times, and at different scales ...</p>
<p>Leitner, H. (2004), 'The Politics of Scale and Networks of Spatial Connectivity: Transnational Interurban Networks and Rescaling of Political Governance in Europe', in Sheppard, E. & McMaster, R. B. (Eds.), <i>Scale and Geographic Inquiry: Nature, Society, and Method</i> (pp. 236-255), Blackwell, Oxford.</p>	<p>Leitner (2004: 237):</p> <p>Today, virtually all modern nation-states and their subnational units have become increasingly enmeshed in larger patterns of global transformations and flows, affecting the nature of politics and governance and their geographies (Held et al., 1999). ... Economic globalization and the rise of supranational institutions also have been associated with a decrease in power of the nation-state relative to the global and sub-national scales. Together, these developments suggest that the geographic scale at which political power and authority is located does not constitute a natural order, but rather is constructed and subject to change. Geographers have used the notion of the politics of scale to explain such sociospatial transformations.</p>
<p>Australian Local Government Association (2005), 'About ALGA', online at www.alga.asn.au/about/ (last updated 14 July 2005, accessed July 2006).</p>	<p>One of the great strengths of local government is its diversity. The population and geographic size of councils differ greatly. The largest local government authority by population is the Brisbane City Council with 900,000 residents. The average council population is 26,400. The largest council by area is the Shire of East Pilbara in WA covering 379,000 square kilometres (population 7,000).</p>
<p>Bulkeley, H. (2005), 'Reconfiguring environmental governance: towards a politics of scales and networks', <i>Political Geography</i>, Vol. 24, No. 8, November 2005, pp. 875-902.</p>	<p>Bulkeley (2005: 883):</p> <p>It has become an accepted truism within human geography that scales are socially and politically constructed, and thus contested (Brenner, 2001; Marston, 2000; McCann, 2003). The politics of scale involves 'continuous reshuffling and reorganisations of spatial scales' which are 'an integral part of social strategies and struggles for control and empowerment' (Swyngedouw, 2000: 70). Such struggles are important because "the particular ways in which scale is produced have material consequences. Scale making is not only a discursive practice, it is also the tangible outcome of the practices and everyday life as they articulate with and transform macro-level social structures" (Marston, 2004: 173; see also Boyle, 2002).</p>